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Abstract—We explain, step by step, how we strategically
circumvented the Nintendo Switch’s system security, from basic
userland code execution, to undermining and exposing the secrets
of the security co-processor.
To this end, we’ve identified and utilized two distinct analysis
procedures. The software-based analysis suffices for reverse-
engineering the userland and operating system services, and
is necessary for a general architectural understanding of the
software systems in the Nintendo Switch. While this method is
extremely powerful and provides significant leverage over the
control of the system and its software security, a hardware-
based method was devised, which employs analysis of the trusted
bootstrap code in ROM. This strategy was essential for the goal
of defeating the hardware root of trust.
Together, these two vectors provide essential insight required to
instance a chain of attacks, in order to gain ROP code execution
from the context of a high-security mode of a secure co-processor
of a running system, thus allowing us to demonstrate a multi-
faceted approach on attacking secure, embedded devices in an
unfamiliar and novel environment.
Index Terms—WebKit, ROP, Use-After-Free, Logic bug, Out
of Bounds read, fuzzing, emulator, protocol reverse engineering,
glitch attack, memory corruption, buffer overflow, stack overflow,
TrustZone, warmboot, CMAC, cryptography, embedded device
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of home entertainment devices, such as video
game consoles, has been a critical focus in consumer products
engineering and development, as a prerequisite to enforcing
the control and flow of media and advertisement revenue, as
well as protecting end-user data, including personally iden-
tifiable and payment information, and protecting intellectual
property on a consumer device. The use of Digital Rights
Management (DRM) techniques, involving cryptographic sig-
natures, depends on securing digital secrets and title content,
and mitigating against attacks, both hardware and software,
local and remote, in an evolving landscape of platform security
challenges.
Video game consoles, in particular, pose a multi-faceted
platform security engineering challenge, with many critical
parts maintaining highly-demanding cryptographical systems,
while not compromising the performance of the running game
program. These challenges have made video game consoles
a particularly interesting case study on platform security,
through the lens of research.
While older consoles had minimal security, usually to
prevent counterfeit and unlicensed hardware and software from
entering the market, more modern consoles have begun to
employ intensified system security methods, usually focused
on protecting the game media from being copied. Although
earlier attempts at securing these consoles have been met with
trivial exploits [1] [2], newer consoles have employed more
serious defenses, and researchers have had to likewise apply
their creative ingenuity, and sometimes discover novel methods
[3] to find security flaws in these systems.
The Switch, briefly
The Nintendo Switch is Nintendo’s take on state-of-the-
art platform security for embedded devices. It does have all
you would expect: a full address-space layout randomiza-
tion (ASLR) scheme, hardware-enforced no-execute (NX) to
facilitate a write-xor-execute (WˆX) memory policy, sand-
boxed userland applications, and a microkernel with a mod-
ular, minimally-privileged, cryptographically-marshalled ser-
vices architecture enabling strict isolation of services and
enforcing a principle of least privilege. In addition to these
software mechanisms, the hardware platform provides ARM
TrustZone capabilities, and a somewhat useful security co-
processor, which are used by a secure monitor program and
secure firmware to verify that the boot path had not been tam-
pered with, and decrypt protected boot programs, applications,
and content.
In March 2017, at the time of the Nintendo Switch release,
we began our research, in order to understand this new device.
The first thing that we noticed right away, is that Nintendo
definitely seems to have learned from its past mistakes.
II. USERLAND EXPLOITATION
A. Web of (dis)trust
An interesting point is in how Nintendo dealt with the
possibility of browsers being a target, as they had been in
the past, [4] [5] by removing access to the browser altogether,
no longer touting it as a feature.
While this is radical, this would have been indeed a some-
what useful mitigation... if we really had no way to actually
launch it. As a matter of fact the browser was still present, as
an applet program for use by the system and games, to provide
web- based or HTML5 content, such as software manuals
or tailored online experiences. However, this browser applet
could only connect, through a secure protocol such as HTTPS,
to websites to whom it would have been whitelisted for access.
It was also capable of accessing a limited set of local files. So,
this browser seemed rather useless to our research effort. That
is, until you realize that update 2.0.0, an update available at
the release of the Nintendo Switch, added a notable exception
to the restrictions, for authenticating to public Wi-Fi.
As a handheld console, this makes sense. Allowing the user
to connect to public Wi-Fi access points when, say, waiting
for a train, is a function that should be supported by a mobile
device like this. The issue here, is that by only obscuring the
fully-featured web browser behind the captive-portal landing
page function, which is necessary to allow users to authenticate
on many public Wi-Fi networks, entirely destroys and buries
Nintendo’s one-pronged approach on browser security thus far.
These Wi-Fi networks often depend on a web browser.
Such schemes, most of the time, do not use any kind of
secure protocol for the HTTP connection and, even if it did, it
would be impractical if not impossible, to actually go through
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2and whitelist, one by one, all the public Wi-Fi landing pages
in the world. This empowers us to perform a simple server-
side redirection to a web page of choice, one hosted locally
and under our control, and begin to study the system.
B. detachSecurity()
Web browsers have long been a target for security re-
searchers, as many embedded devices use web features, and
most of those use WebKit for their browser engine, a program
mostly licensed under LGPL. This means that any commercial
use of the WebKit engine must redistribute the source code
of the software, including any modifications made to it. Not
only does this allow us to reproduce an instrumentable test
environment for debugging outside of the system, but by
its popularity and sheer pervasiveness in the desktop world,
we can easily and quickly know which existing, public and
available security vulnerabilities haven’t been patched for our
target version of WebKit, and adapt/reimplement them as
needed for this system.
A thing to note, however, is that the WebKit maintainers
(Apple) don’t just hand us a neat, preformatted list of security
bugs for us to study, as security issues are considered protected
reports. They are removed from public view by the bug tracker,
as necessary to allow for mitigations to develop internally.
These reports permanently remain obscured by the bug tracker.
Although, as those bug reports are mentioned in the commits
which fix them, we can simply use the old trick [5] of making
a list of all commits linking to bug reports which we do not
have access to, as those are presumably security-related issues
of particular interest to us.
On our side, we settled for a use-after-free vulnerabil-
ity in the FrameTree unload handlers [6] which we named
detachSecurity(), as we could simply have a frame DOM
object, ”attached” to a detached tree. We then worked on
getting some instrumentation in place, by setting up an RPC
server. This let us interact with our exploit remotely to, say,
dump current memory. Soon after, we realized one important
thing: the Switch does not have JIT in its browser.
Since the user is not intended to be able to use a web
browser at all, the lack of JIT surprisingly makes sense
here. Traditionally, to exploit WebKit, the typical procedure
involved creating some dummy function or functions, running
it enough times so that it is selected to be optimized, wait
for it to be compiled and transferred into the JIT memory,
and then, since JIT memory is writable and executable by
design, use a vulnerability that gives you a write in program
memory, in order to overwrite said function with our own
code, and execute it. The lack of JIT, and the subsequent lack
of executable-and-writeable memory, completely prevented us
from using this technique to gain arbitrary code execution.
We had to resort to the use of Return Oriented Programming
(ROP), by way of overwriting function pointers. While ROP is
very powerful in its own right, by letting us redirect program
control flow, it does not let us redirect it to our own code.
This primitive level of control, however, is enough for further
research that could lead to privilege escalation, so we went
and began to implement some ROP gadgets — essentially
groups of pointers to functions and existing executable code
fragments, based on our memory dumps, which we can use
to effect changes on the state of the system and test for more
powerful vulnerabilities.
C. PegaSwitch
That period of research was, unfortunately for us, short-
lived. Almost at the same time, an entire toolkit for browser-
based exploitation on the Nintendo Switch was released by
another independent team of researchers. The toolkit was
called ”PegaSwitch”. [7]
While this was frustrating, as most of our effort up to this
point had now seemed worthless, this was also an invaluable
research tool for us, as it implemented all the core ROP func-
tions we cared about. Whereas we had planned on discovering
an applicable WebKit browser vulnerability, with the expecta-
tion that we would have to engineer an exploit stack (including
ROP, privilege escalation, arbitrary code execution, sandbox
escape, and shellcode to launch outside the browser sandbox),
PegaSwitch used an already available exploit, namely CVE-
2016-4657 [8], commonly known as ”Pegasus”, with the added
twist that this exploit stack was already implemented for
iOS systems on devices with the AArch64 architecture [9],
explaining why they were able to get to ROP so quickly
and reverse engineer so many things in so little time, as the
Nintendo Switch is also an AArch64 machine.
Now that we have remote userland ROP code execution, our
next goal was then to reverse-engineer the inner workings of
the operating system, to identify potential targets for further
escalation. Horizon is the name of the Nintendo Switch’s
operating system, the kernel, and its system services. Horizon
is also the OS on the Nintendo 3DS; the Switch version
is a further development of this OS, with refinements and
further progress towards being a full-fledged operating system
framework. The 3DS had been thoroughly researched and
documented by the time of our research, and understanding
that platform was a great help in understanding the rational of
its successor, as will be explained later.
To the effort of reverse-engineering the OS, we scanned
the addressable memory for executable formats in order to
gain useful insight on the fundamental details of the software
systems. One of the first things we realized, apart from the
executables being in an apparently new, custom format —
not uncommon for Nintendo [10] — is that due to dynamic
library linking and loading, we were able to retrieve a bunch
of symbols which identified available services.
D. Services, explained
What follows is in-depth information about the system ser-
vice architecture of Nintendo’s Horizon operating system. This
section in particular is informative; it contains information
that we had to figure out after-the-fact, but is essential to
understand the rationale behind our method, moving forward.
The userland API of the Nintendo Switch is comprised of
services, provided by system service processes, or servers.
These are processes which run in the background, and pro-
vide controlled-access, higher-privileged system functions to
3userland applications as well as other servers, by way of an
IPC interface.
Most of these services are limited as to what they can affect,
and their servers load as a userland program would, and thus
have restricted access to other services and hardware, as any
application.
Some of these services are especially privileged, and their
servers load very early in the boot sequence. Because they
are loaded so early, before the mechanisms are in place to
securely load and verify executable content from storage, the
first six of these servers are contained within the kernel binary,
and load into memory along with the kernel. These kernel-
initiated processes, or KIPs, are compressed and packaged
with a unique executable container format, and unpacked by
the kernel once it is loaded and running. Once spawned,
these six servers are sufficient for continuing the secure boot
process.
Access to services from userland applications, is coordi-
nated by a service manager (sm), which is itself a server, with
service endpoints. The sm reads the list of allowed services
for the application, registered to sm at launch. This list is
in the executable’s metadata on storage, which is signed by
Nintendo during their production-signing step, the same for all
applications, games, game cartridges, and system programs for
the Switch. That list’s signature is verified by the filesystem
server (fs), along with the executable code, to ensure that it
has not been tampered with after installation.
E. IPC and services API, explained
Nintendo had chosen to use a marshalled, limited code
surface in the serving of IPC in the kernel, and to segregate
software risk and performance domains into separate services.
Access to each service endpoint, both by applications and
lesser-privileged services, requires different privilege and ac-
cess flags, enforced cryptographically by a code-signing trust
root.
This is done to further limit the attack surface of kernel-
level and privileged code, while not compromising on the
performance of the game program at the forefront. Its kernel
is a microkernel, as stated previously. Through discovery of
symbol tables in a dump of early firmware, we found that the
kernel and servers are linked against the same internal library,
possibly to minimize code variances in common security-
critical functions, but mostly so that they could follow one
known-good implementation of the rather wild IPC handler
code, which we’ll explain in detail further on.
To summarize this a little bit better, let us imagine a process
wants to use bsd sockets, which are available as a service under
the ‘bsdsockets‘ server process. First the process is going to
connect to a port named ”sm:”, short for Service Manager. It
is going to use the IPC command 0, ”Initialize”, at this port,
to bring up the service frontend for the application, inform the
service of your service access, and allow sm to ensure that the
service is loaded and ready to accept commands, and inform
the application that it is ready. On a successful response from
the service manager, the Initialize command is then followed
by IPC command 1, ”GetService”, with the name of the service
we want as an argument. Let’s assume for our example, the
service is ”bsd:u”. We now have a handle to our service and
are able to send commands via that handle, through IPC. A
simpler comparison could be made that we interface with the
system and its services through an address-and-port system,
in comparison to TCP/IP: the service name defines where the
command is to be addressed; meanwhile the handle, like a
TCP port, tells us where to send a command. The IPC header
defines the command format.
Fig. 1. The example above illustrated
F. Breaking through: Privileged service access
As the astute reader may have noticed, not only are service
names segmented, e.g., ”name:function”, allowing for more
fine-tuned isolation, but they are managed by a central service-
managing managed services server, the Service Manager
server and its service manager services, which we will get back
to in a moment. The first step in our research was, logically,
to understand how to communicate to those services, in the
hope to escalate privileges and reverse-engineer more of the
system. Luckily for us, the architecture hasn’t changed much
since the days of the Nintendo 3DS and, having WebKit OSS
source code, we could reasonably translate the unincorporated
SDK library calls to service and IPC patterns with the help
of the 3DS and its webkit binaries, which include the data
4necessary. Through this effort, we were able to identify and
reverse engineer a bunch of service related functions. However,
unfortunately, most of the services’ names, functions and the
IPC command structure seemed to have been changed entirely,
making us do the documentation effort and tooling all over
again.
Reversing the port system was trivial, as it was a simple
syscall away — namely, poking at SVC 0x1f, ”svcConnect-
ToNamedPort” [11], was enough to verify that the named
ports enumerated prior were correct, and to enable us to
further manipulate the services behind these ports. Gaining a
meaningful understanding of the IPC command structure was,
to put it mildly, a fair bit more painful. By ”a fair bit”, of
course, we regret to inform you, it had been head bangingly
stupidly obfuscated, and blanketed in seemingly nonsensical
optimizations. The more dedicated (read: masochistic) reader
may wish to consult the additional documentation about the
IPC buffer descriptors, and the bit shuffling hacks that happen
behind the scenes, to completely grasp the magnitude of the
topic at hand [12].
Let us assume we somehow reverse engineered this protocol
and reimplemented it. As we do not have any way to dump
privileged code yet, our first reflex was to fuzz the services to
find any evicence of a crash thanks to an unexpected input,
while documenting them... or I should say, it should have
been our first option. Remember how I mentioned the Service
Manager up above? If you follow the rules, you are supposed
to call an Initialize function, which sets the PID of the current
process to handle service permissions. It turns out, you can
just skip the initialize function. Doing that, leaves the PID
field uninitialized. Uninitialized fields are set to 0. PID below
8 have unrestricted service access, which we could also deduce
at this point since the 3DS worked in a similar fashion [13].
It should suffice that the name given to this exploit, ”sm:h”,
need not be further explained.
In brief:
• Features that are able to be abused, will be abused, even
if they’re not ”supposed” to be.
• Completely removing such a feature may not be the
easiest solution, and it may not be the best for all use-
cases, but it is the most secure.
• Sometimes compromises are necessary to meet demands,
but be sure to investigate all alternatives before settling
with the lesser-secure option.
• Security through obscurity is not secure. Sometimes the
very fact that something is hidden, is more than enough
information to formulate a plan of action. (This goes
to both the Wi-Fi browser access, and the WebKit bug
reports.)
• Just because something can’t make code executable,
doesn’t mean it can’t execute code. ROP is a very
powerful exploitation technique.
• If you reuse common libraries, code and programs from
other platforms, you run the risk of importing existing
vulnerabilities and exploits from those platforms, too.
• If the prior system is documented, its successor will be
easier to figure out. This can be used to the benefit of
both protecting, and exploiting, the system.
• Stripping executables of their debug strings and symbols
makes the adversary’s job harder.
• A comprehensive audit strategy on privileged code’s API
endpoints is crucial.
III. PRIVILEGE ESCALATION: SYSTEM SERVICES
A. Following a lead
All system service processes except for the kernel-initiated
servers, are contained in ”sysmodules” in storage, like the
3DS.
By this point we had a huge attack surface, nothing short of
unrestricted access to all system services, which we could take
advantage of to find flaws in privileged processes. However,
there remained much mystery behind the workings of the
system. We had not dumped the sysmodules yet, and thus
could not perform out-of-system analysis on these binaries.
We began automating the process of fuzzing some services,
and then kind of got disinterested from research temporarily.
In the meanwhile both Switchbrew and Reswitched indepen-
dently found an exploit called ”pl:utonium”. This exploit was
in the first commands of the service pl:u (which handles
the system shared font in shared memory), initialized by the
ns server, which read from an array using the user-input
arguments. That input was obviously not sanitized prior to
use, allowing them to dump the entire binary of the NS
sysmodule [14]. ReSwitched, on their side, created an emulator
to automate the findings of vulnerabilities through fuzzing [15]
[16]. Right after this, we had a surge of renewed interest into
the Switch which made us investigate some of the highest
privileged sysmodules, as they would be the most useful to
break.
Moving on, we were aware that Plutoo was able to dump
system modules [17] while excluding the possibility of a
kernel hack [18]. This led us to believe that the flaw was
present in some of the more privileged system servers, namely
the ones built-in that Plutoo mentioned. We were also curious
on why plutoo listed both the title id and the name of the
modules in the post [17] mentioning the dump, and, while
this could have been a coincidence, we decided to look at
what this could lead us to.
As such we looked at the list of title ids that were currently
documented on switchbrew [19] and enumerated all the priv-
ileged ones: fs, ldr, ncm, pm, sm and finally, boot. As the sm
server’s services have a very small attack surface with very few
commands, and we had already bypassed it by way of sm:h,
we decided to not look at it. The boot server being a ”headless”
server without any kind of service frontend, exploiting it was
out of the question.
B. The FS services
After removing those two from the equation, we decided to
look at everything filesystem related, because of the peculiar
name listing in the post that plutoo made [17]. And so we
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in, fully-privileged module that was also related to filesystems.
We began looking at the FS documentation, and studying
and exploring every possible entrypoint in the service set
handled by the FS server. Coincidentally, the first service port
listed was fsp-ldr, along with its first command (”OpenCode-
FileSystem”, though it was referred to as ”MountCode” back
then, due to a lack of debugging symbols for naming internal
things).
Unfortunately, trying to bind to it directly, throws an error.
We had somewhat anticipated this; building upon our experi-
ence with, and knowledge of, the 3DS, we figured that there
was the likelihood that this service had a session limit, and that
said limit was occupied at initialization time, something which
happened to the FS counterpart of the 3DS [20]. As the service
name was fsp-ldr (which we presume stands for ”privileged
filesystem service pertaining to the loader”), we figured out
that if we crashed the ldr service, which, one could infer, had
an exclusive handle to fsp-ldr... we could get access to the
fsp-ldr handle instead!
And as a matter of fact, this is what happened: Any method
of crashing, killing, stopping, unloading, or otherwise causing
a denial-of-service attack to ldr (of which there are several),
would cause the ldr server to release its handle on fsp-ldr,
which we could hook up to, and then ask fsp-ldr nicely to
dump all the code modules it had access to, since by virtue of
its function, it needs access to the binaries for applications and
sysmodules alike. Soon after we figured this out, a description
of the vulnerability, a minimal proof-of-concept exploit, and
a functional ldr DoS were released to the public by other
researchers [21]. We found out that they had left out enough
details so as to not completely trivialize the exploit. As we
found, there was no reason to keep the full-featured exploit
private, and hoarding that exploit would only hurt the further-
developing public research effort, so we ported our unabridged
fsp-ldr exploit code to the DoS framework that they had
released and published it, including it into PegaSwitch [22].
In brief:
• While separating services from more privileged code
in the same program is a noble attempt at preventing
leakage, and marshalling the service domain and its
endpoint away from the core program helps... again,
a comprehensive audit strategy can prevent faults in
privileged code.
• Just as parallellizing computation speeds results, so does
parallellizing research.
• While dependency chains are often hell on system de-
signers, asserting a dependency such that, for example,
fsp-ldr can only operate when ldr is present, would have
kept fsp-ldr from being exploited.
IV. BEYOND PRIVILEGE ESCALATION: BOOT AND TRUST
A. Approaching the Tegra
The following section is written under the assumption that
we never did any work on the Tegra X1 hardware prior to
beginning the research effort with the Nintendo Switch. We
had, however, already been working on the Tegra X1 platform,
since around August 2016. Unfortunately, we cannot discuss
this prior research, as it is held under NDA until further notice.
We believe that such antagonistic NDA terms needlessly
restrict innovation and hamper security for the company in
question, as well as harming the professional security research
community and vendors who implement Tegra-based solu-
tions. We will say that at least one major vendor that makes
use of Tegra X1-based platforms, abuses these non-disclosure
terms to the detriment of their researchers.
Having a way to dump almost all of the system modules,
we began to look at our options to escalate privileges in a
more concrete, reproducible and persistent fashion. Having the
binaries had helped a ton, and while we did get somewhere
with our newfound information, we were stopped dead in our
tracks by another research team, fail0verflow, who had shown
off a cold-boot exploit [23], hinting at the fact that they were
able to dump the bootrom.
At this point we were aware that a development kit for the
Tegra X1, the System-on-Chip (SoC) used by the Nintendo
Switch, was publicly available for purchase... and that it
most likely had the same bootrom. Thus, the fun part began:
glitching and hardware fault engineering was put into play. We
will mostly skip over this part, as Yifan Lu already explained
very well how glitching could be applied to embedded devices
in the past [3] [24] and an entire talk had already been
given at the C4 OpenChaos event on glitching the Tegra X1,
specifically. [25].
Essentially, we took the path of least resistance, and voltage-
glitched a Tegra X1 development kit, and a second device
which we unfortunately cannot discuss here due to the afore-
mentioned NDA. As we are unable to discuss that project,
we will assume that our research is entirely unique and that
fail0verflow inspired us to look into the bootrom, for the
purposes of this paper. We will try to release the research
currently under NDA as soon as possible. We are sorry for any
mandatory omissions we do in this paper, and are hopeful that
the available literature will be more than sufficient to satiate
the curiosity of the dedicated reader.
B. Analyzing the boot ROM
So, we glitched our device and successfully acquired the
contents of the boot IROM. At this point, since we were aware
of fail0verflow’s tweet [23], we saw that they had, purposefully
or not, hid the USB port of the console. Understanding that the
USB protocol — especially USB 3 and USB Type-C — has a
level of implementation complexity that often stretches beyond
the definition of ”acceptable”, and on the heels of several USB
kernel flaws released a bit before this tweet [26], we surmised
that it was fairly likely that the flaw was related to USB in
some way. At this point we had only gained a fairly minimal
understanding of the Tegra boot firmware logic, and as such,
decided to write an emulator for it, and employed dynamic
program analysis using that emulator, to aid the static analysis
effort.
Building this emulator not only forced us to understand the
boot flow of the Tegra X1, including its recovery mode (RCM)
6which makes use of USB, but it also made us understand way
better how the boot ROM code worked. It had helped so much,
that we actually found the bug in a minimal amount of time,
with a minimal amount of effort, with our emulator still only
operating in HLE (High Level Emulation)!.
The plan we had in mind for this emulator was to, first of
all, get an idea of the bootflow by implementing all the main
cryptographic/USB functions in HLE, in order to develop a
tool that would interface with the console’s RCM. We already
knew that, besides the RCM interface, there wasn’t a way to
interface to the console’s boot ROM to provide input, external
to the console. Once we had a better definition of the RCM
interface over USB, we would then make a basic fuzzing tool
that would run in the background over a long time, while we
ported our emulator to full Low Level Emulation (LLE), to
allow us to more completely simulate the processor and its
devices, to thoroughly fuzz out any trivial bugs we may have
missed up to this point.
While we were working on the HLE part of our emulator,
we decided to perform a quick audit. The USB and crypto-
graphic functions, being prime targets, were the first items
of interest to us, with some focus on cryptographic fails.
Fortunately for us, the bug occured at a point in the RCM
program flow before any kind of cryptographic verification
was performed. As such we discovered it naturally when trying
to understand the RCM.
Fig. 2. The bug, courtesy of ktemkin’s fuse´e gele´e report [27]
The flaw was fairly simple actually: in some functions of
the USB protocol, we could arbitrarily control the size of a
memcpy, allowing us a good, simple buffer overflow, just like
the 90s, with no mitigation whatsoever, no memory protection
or isolation, as this is a bootrom, naturally, with no operating
system or kernel to enforce it with. The memcpy occurs before
the stack, so you just overwrite the stack pointer, point it to
the code you copied, and since there are no stack cookies, no
ASLR, and absent no-execute memory policy, you just watch
it execute your code. It’s so easy, it almost feels like cheating.
C. God’s in his TrustZone, all’s right with the world
Having access to an exploit in boot ROM, we had no real
incentive to work on the switch again, but we were curious
about some known but private vulnerabilities nonetheless,
especially one that the ReSwitched group called ”de´ja` vu”.
To put that into context: ReSwitched, early on, publicized a
write-up about a flaw they found called ”jamais vu”, which
allowed code execution on the Secure Monitor of the Nintendo
Switch [28], while announcing de´ja` vu. As this is the type of
exploit that really makes use of all the unexplored intricacies
of the system, we will more thoroughly explain the overall
technical architecture of the Nintendo Switch.
The Nintendo Switch is composed, first and foremost, of
a SoC called the Tegra X1, created by Nvidia. While it may
sound unintuitive, this SoC is actually composed of several
processors with different architectures and different use-cases,
out of which some are particularly notable.
The main CPU core complex, that we will henceforth
call the CCPLEX, is the primary applications processor. The
”Boot and Power Management Processor”, referred to in this
paper as BPMP or BPMP-Lite, handles system bringup, power
management, and is technically the ”root processor” of a Tegra
system. (The Reference Manual calls it ”BPMP-Lite”, as it
lacks some features that more advanced versions of the SoC
will apparently get.) The boot ROM that we dumped before,
is referred to by Nvidia as the BPMP-FW, the ”firmware”
for this subsystem, because it is the first program loaded and
the first processor to initialize on power-up. There is also a
third ”core complex”, called the Tegra Security Co-Processor
(TSEC) powered by a Falcon microprocessor, that we will talk
more in depth about in the following section. For the purpose
of this section, knowing that the BPMP is meant to handle
power-on bringup, initial bootloader, and low-level tasks is
more than enough.
The CCPLEX is a somewhat recent ARM processor, which
means it is capable of a feature that ARM calls TrustZone. For
those unfamiliar with the concept, TrustZone is a hardware-
enforced virtualized system-separated enclave on the proces-
sor, used to isolate security-critical parts of the operating
system as much as possible (in the case of the Nintendo
Switch, its internal cryptographic engine). This introduces a
notion of ”Secure World” and ”Normal World”, both running
their own OS and having their own separate resources. For
example, the Secure World has its own secure RAM space,
”TZRAM”.
In our case, the ”Normal World” is the Horizon kernel,
with its servers and userland applications, and the ”Secure
World” contains the ”Secure Monitor” of the Nintendo Switch,
which is just its cryptographic engine, as mentioned above,
alongside some rudimentary power management services. The
normal world interacts with this secure world by using Secure
Monitor Calls (SMC), roughly analogous to kernel syscalls,
or ”Supervisor Calls” (SVC). This is an important part of
Nintendo’s security scheme, as this allows them to seal keys,
even in the case of complete kernel takeover, so that:
1) We cannot replicate their cryptographic engine outside
of the device, and
2) They can always patch known vulnerabilities, update the
keys and we would have no way to break the DRM of
newer games.
7Fig. 3. TrustZone illustration
Unfortunately for them, having bootrom code execution
kind of spoils the fun... but let’s just forget that for a moment.
Continuing on what we mentioned above, we know that
ReSwitched managed to get code execution on the Secure
Monitor which they called ”de´ja` vu”, on top of ”jamais vu”,
which pointed us in the right direction, especially thanks to
the amazing write-up for the latter.
We were still pretty dormant up until firmware revision 6.0.0
of the Nintendo Switch. The founder of, and a former lead
of the ReSwitched group had independently discovered and
privately disclosed a vulnerability to Nintendo that was part
of the exploit chain that formed de´ja` vu [29], and as of 6.0,
Nintendo had also mitigated the exploit itself! [30] This was
more than enough to bring back interest to this bug, even
though we would have no real use for it.
D. Waking up in another world
So, after all this fuss, what is Jamais Vu all about? Essen-
tially, it deals with deep sleep — a mode which ”shuts down”
all hardware, except for the minimal power draw necessary
for sustaining the Power Management Controller (PMC), and
persisting the contents of DRAM. When resuming from deep
sleep, the BPMP will begin as if being cold-booted, but it
instead resumes the system state in RAM.
As mentioned in the excellent write-up cited above [28], in
earlier firmwares, before entering deep sleep, the Secure Mon-
itor would save its state from its TZRAM, to the CCPLEX’s
”main” DRAM. It saves the contents encrypted, along with a
Message authentication code (MAC) to ensure that it had not
been modified or tampered with. The MAC is saved to a set
of hardware registers in the Power Management Controller
(PMC), which persist through deep-sleep. The idea is that,
when rebooted, unless you had bootrom code execution, you
would not be able to modify the Secure Monitor whatsoever,
keeping it secure and encrypted, so that no information leaks
from Secure World can happen.
There was, unfortunately for Nintendo, a small omission
in that trust logic: userland could modify the PMC registers,
breaking entirely the ”trust” in TrustZone. We could simply
replace the copy of the TZRAM with our own, change the
MAC result to verify against ours and, thanks to another bug
within the boot ROM, because it fails to correctly verify the
state of the Security Engine (SE) it restores, we can simply
replace the keys used to decrypt the TZRAM by ones we
control, to make it decrypt and verify our own TZRAM.
On top of all of that, we could have modified BPMP
exception vectors to point at code we owned, leading to pre-
sleep code execution on the BPMP. We could have rewritten
the RESET vector to execute our code at startup and, as such,
be able to control the Secure World like before. This didn’t last
long, though, as all of this would be fixed with a launch-day
firmware update, 2.0.0.
Or at least this is what Nintendo thought: Indeed, while
PMC was effectively made Secure-Mode only as far as we
can tell, the BPMP exception vectors checks haven’t been
thoroughly reviewed: a high speed internal bus of the Tegra
X1, the AHB, has a DMA interface, conveniently named AHB-
DMA. AHB-DMA is supposedly ”deprecated”, but it still
exists in the X1. Because this DMA hadn’t been otherwise
disabled or limited to specific memory ranges, we could
overwrite the exception vectors of the BPMP, leading to a
full compromise once again. The good news, is that the AHB-
DMA interface is only accessible to the kernel, running on
CCPLEX. The bad news, is that it is available to the CCPLEX,
let alone non-Secure World kernel code, in the first place.
In brief:
• Glitch attacks, fault injection, power analysis, and other
hardware-level attacks, will violate your preconceptions
of software/hardware validity at the lowest level, unless
you proactively protect against unexpected code or reg-
ister data injection.
• Complexity (such as, full implementations of bus and
network stacks, RSA cryptosystems, complex implemen-
tations of storage interfaces, filesystems and other device
driver code) increases the potential vulnerability surface.
Paradoxically, the more complex the program, the easier
it becomes to exploit, in general.
• Low-level boot-time resources are a very high focus for
researchers to audit. Not only the bootloader, but recovery
modes, factory modes, download modes, whatever they
may be called, if it’s loading code into the system from
an external source, it is going to be thoroughly studied
for any possible flaws.
• Moving data between security domains (TZRAM to
DRAM, for instance) is another high-focus area to audit.
Anything that depends on securely saving and restoring
such data should not depend on an unsecured system
(PMC registers, for instance) to protect them.
• ”Undocumented” features aren’t... or won’t be for long,
in the context of security research.
• Further, ”Deprecated” means nothing to a security re-
searcher, until the ”deprecated” feature is removed.
• Validating the state of privileged boot services goes a
long way to enforcing secure boot. Payload signatures
aren’t enough; further boot-time measurements of code
and state are necessary.
• Stating that an exploit exists is as good as publishing it;
if you don’t, someone else will.
8V. BEYOND TRUST: FROM TSEC TO 0XDEAD5EC1
Having bootrom-level code execution, we thought we were
pretty much done with the security challenges of this console...
And yet, Nintendo still managed to surprise us.
Before we touch on how Nintendo revamped their trust
chain, we’ll take a look at some background on console
security.
A. How Homebrew Works
The community of developers and users making and us-
ing unlicensed homebrew software for game consoles, de-
pends on the ability to run arbitrary, unauthorized code in
a convenient way (e.g., without physically modifying the
device or installing aftermarket or replacement components
through high-risk hardware modifications). In order to run
unauthorized code, the strict code-signature enforcement on
applications needs to be relaxed, if not removed entirely. On
older consoles and handheld systems, there was no code-
signature enforcement; running homebrew applications de-
pended entirely on gaining any arbitrary code execution, most
commonly through specially-crafted user-generated data or
savedata. On later consoles, cryptographical measures had
taken place to simultaneously enable game data to be stored on
removable, user-accessible memory, as well as to protect the
game data from tampering, reverse-engineering, and outright
replacement, and prevent unauthorized applications from being
able to run on users’ systems. Needless to say, these measures
are often defeated by security researchers, and made available
to homebrew developers and users. In past systems with code-
signature enforcement, these workarounds had been achieved
through gaining code execution, and once running on the
target, installing modified or patched versions of the firmware
or operating system, typically called ”custom firmware”, or
CFW. For instance, installing FlashMe on the Nintendo DS
allows running unsigned code directly over the Download Play
feature, through a protocol termed ”Wireless Multiboot”.
However, the ability to modify the system firmware or OS
contents, had given rise to a handful of malware programs, of-
ten disguised as pirated games or highly anticipated homebrew
applications. Trojan/DSBrick.A, one such piece of malware,
simply displays a brick-wall texture on the displays of the DS
system, while it overwrites the system firmware, rendering
the console entirely useless (a ”brick”), requiring risky or
costly repairs to return the system to a usable state. As well,
earlier Nintendo Wii homebrew methods involved replacing
IOS packages (essentially, system drivers) with custom ones
enabling homebrew to have access to more hardware that only
few games had taken advantage of. These ”cIOS”, custom
IOS packages, were high-risk modifications, and often led
to bricked Wii systems, especially if modified IOSes were
installed before accepting a system update from Nintendo.
Because of the risk of these and other modifications to
the system potentially leading to damage, customer support
headaches, and in the case of DSBrick, media attention,
console manufacturers had to make a compromise to further
secure against system modifications, while still allowing up-
grades to firmware, system software, bundled applications,
downloaded applications and content.
Because of the heightened protections on firmware mod-
ifications, homebrew methods on later consoles have given
rise to live, in-memory patching, rather than modifying the
necessary code in storage, either through modified bootloaders
(such as Enso [31], for the PlayStation Vita) or through custom
kernel modules or system programs which patch memory
as well as add features (Prometheus/Pro-CFW [32], for the
PlayStation Portable), or a combination of the two (Luma3DS
[33], for the Nintendo 3DS). By tradition, these pre-loaders,
in-memory patchers, modified or reimplemented components
continue to be called ”CFW”, despite often being neither
custom, nor firmware. These CFW environments almost uni-
versally disable or work around code-signature enforcement.
B. Switching gears
Earlier on, Nintendo Switch homebrew was rudimentary.
The limited homebrew entrypoints available had placed many
restrictions on the capabilities of such software, when com-
pared to native, signed applications. The first public homebrew
user and development environment, ReSwitched’s PegaSwitch,
which ran on system software 3.0.0, was used to launch the
Homebrew Menu, or hbmenu, an alternative launcher, loader
and host for homebrew applications compiled as relocatable
code objects (.nro files). This menu was intended to be boot-
strapped from an existing application that had been exploited
to run arbitrary code, which either had, or had escalated to
obtain, the necessary permissions to read content from storage,
and dynamically load executable code.
The application from which homebrew was bootstrapped,
in this early environment, was the WiFiWebAuthApplet, or
the captive-portal landing page web browser applet. As such,
being an applet, the programs were extremely restricted with
the amount of memory they could allocate, as applets ran in the
foreground, while an application (such as a video game) was
either running or suspended, in the background. As well, the
web browser had only very minimal permissions, and while
this limited environment would more than suffice for testing
new toolchains and enabling homebrew development on the
platform, the Switch is a very powerful system and users
were looking to develop more advanced homebrew, such as
PC game engines, emulators, and even creative tools, which
would take advantage of the hightened permissions and larger
memory allocation a full application context can provide.
In order to run more advanced homebrew applications, a
CFW environment for Horizon became a requisite, since such
an environment would be able to further enable homebrew
access to the system. The currently state-of-the-art implemen-
tation, Atmosphe`re [34], actually reimplements several system
modules and servers, the secure monitor, the bootloader, and
parts of the kernel-initiated processes, and plans to reimple-
ment the entire kernel of Horizon later down the road, making
it an actual CFW.
The important thing is that we are within the environment
of Nintendo’s firmware, and as such, we depend on their
cryptosystem. As Stratosphe`re, Atmosphe`re’s sysmodule reim-
plementation, is not entirely complete. It currently patches the
9boot code package, Package2; and as such, needs to be able to
decrypt it. Even if, by some miracle, the ongoing community
effort eventually allowed us to entirely reimplement all of
Horizon, we would still hit a wall when it comes to actually
playing Switch games, as we would need a complete reim-
plementation of their cryptosystem. While this is doable, the
6.2.0 update introduced new security features barring us from
accessing secret hardware keys, necessary to reimplement the
cryptosystem, as explained more in detail below.
Thus, we need to be able to derive keys on our own to
be able to maintain the current features of this console. And
this changed in the 6.2.0 update. To understand why this is
important, we are going to explain the Nintendo Switch boot
flow and cryptosystem in more detail below.
C. Ignition, Switch
Beginning the boot flow, the BPMP of the SoC powers up,
launching its bootrom. This bootrom, depending on the state
of PMC registers, either performs a warmboot and loads from
existing state in DRAM, or loads and verifies package1, and
jumps to package1ldr. In that case, package1ldr takes care of
decrypting and verifying PK11. Package1, containing pack-
age1ldr and PK11 are stored in the first eMMC boot partition,
and PK11 contains the warmboot binary, NX-Bootloader, and
the secure monitor firmware. The warmboot binary is what
is saved to DRAM by the secure monitor when entering the
deep-sleep state.
After package1ldr does its initialization, it then jumps to the
bootloader within PK11, called NX-Bootloader, which in turn
loads and launches the Horizon OS main kernel and modules.
When the boot server process has initialized, it triggers a
command in the process manager (pm), causing it to load and
launch the boot2 server, which is the first non-built-in system
server. For the sake of simplicity, it is shown in the figure
below that boot launches boot2 directly. boot2 then takes care
of launching all the system servers; one of which, Nintendo
Shell (ns), launches the main front-facing user menu, qlaunch.
Fig. 4. Nintendo Switch boot flow
At the lowest level, prior to the 6.2.0 firmware update,
the entire cryptosystem of the Nintendo Switch relied on 2
keys: The SecureBootKey (SBK)) and TSEC key. The first
key is set by the boot ROM and is console unique, while
the second one was generated from hardware secrets on the
security co-processor, still console unique, which, coupled
with more console uniques keys on the eMMC boot partitions,
generates static keys used for everything after this. The TSEC
firmware was loaded by NX-Bootloader, and we could, at
this point, simply run the firmware blob and read back our
result from the SOR1 registers, which were used as a secure
transfer route between the TSEC and bootloader. We could not
reimplement this firmware either, as only authenticated code,
and thus signed by an approved authority, would have access
to the hardware secrets on the TSEC. This firmware was of
course largely ignored up until the 6.2.0 update.
D. The ”S” in Switch is for ”Secure”
The 6.2.0 update introduced major changes to the way
key generation worked, and most importantly, the TSEC
firmwares. Up to this point the firmware had 3 main stages,
Boot, KeygenLdr and Keygen. As mentioned earlier, TSEC
firmwares can be signed, but they can also be encrypted, and as
such KeygenLdr decrypted Keygen using hardware secrets we
did not have access to, as KeygenLdr was signed. The update
introduced two new stages to this whole chain, SecureBootLdr
and SecureBoot. The entire TSEC boot chain had thus been
reconstructed to the following flow: Boot → SecureBootLdr
→ KeygenLdr → Keygen → SecureBoot.
While KeygenLdr and Keygen haven’t been updated, Se-
cureBoot added some interesting security concepts. Not only
does it generate yet another key from hardware secrets, the
TSEC root key, but this time it tries to prevent us from
actually getting the contents of the SecureBoot binary through
simple means, such as by halting the BPMP, rewriting its
exception vectors, and dropping the BPMP instruction pointer
back into code it controls (a signed and encrypted Package1).
This is actually fairly interesting! We cannot replace any
TSEC firmware blobs with any of our code, because we are
unable to sign it, and we can’t remove it because that code
would generate the new required keys from secrets we don’t
have... This forces us to redirect program flow to code trusted
by Nintendo, making this an adept attempt to re-secure its
console, even after a critical boot firmware bug.
At least, this would be the case, if we weren’t able to simply
fool TSEC into assuming everything is fine, and that we didn’t
just take control from it. We can do just that, because otherwise
what good would a security co-processor be, right? We can use
the BPMP’s control over the internal I/O memory management
unit, the System Memory Management Unit (SMMU) as the
ARM architecture calls it, to redirect all reads and writes
to pages of memory we control, and fool it into thinking it
effectively redirected code flow from our own control, while
it just handed over the keys. That sure is a foolproof way to
go about in-depth platform security.
But Nintendo was not done with TSEC, or at least not yet.
As it turns out, the TSEC had a feature that was not well-
documented (some would argue that it isn’t documented at
all, for our usecase), that came in handy for securing the boot
flow and giving us yet another new challenge. An SMMU
Bypass function is available to the TSEC, which forces the
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TSEC to simply consider all memory as linear, and avoid the
memory virtualization that SMMU can perform. That’s quite a
useful feature for a security coprocessor, we must admit. This
time around, in firmware update 7.0.0, they enabled it, while
doing a bunch of checks to detect virtualization, updating yet
again their TSEC root key so as not to let us use older ones.
E. In-”sept”-tion
Since 7.0.0 had yet again changed the security playing field,
we needed to find another approach to attack TSEC. To explain
our findings, we will discuss how this firmware authenticates
its payloads in depth.
TSEC is based around a Falcon microcontroller. This pro-
cessor has three ”modes” in a security context: Non-Secure
(NS), which typically restricts the microprogram from reading
most registers and memory; Light Secure (LS), which is
rarely used outside of debugging and development; and Heavy
Secure (HS), which enables full access to the cryptographical
hardware, and protected or secret registers and memory.
A small blob of unauthenticated data is present in the
firmware uploaded to the TSEC. that data contains the size
of each payload, and the AES-CMAC (!) that should be
calculated for the payload to pass boot-safety measurements.
Now, if you understand even elementary cryptographical
theory, that seems counter-intuitive. Why AES-CMAC, and
not an asymmetric cypher like RSA? If you get the AES key
used for decryption (and the one necessary for verification),
you can effectively sign your own MAC... and completely
substitute the expected payload for one you have control of!
Well, Nintendo has a reason. Falcon is a rather limited mi-
crocontroller environment. For one, there’s very few memory
headroom to (securely) implement RSA in software. Falcon
has separate data and instruction memory, DMEM and IMEM,
and together they measure in the dozens of kilobytes. For
another, one would have to implement RSA from scratch to the
Falcon microarchitecture, and Nintendo seems to have since
learned not to roll their own crypto... However, the TSEC does
include hardware AES acceleration, which is expected to be
reasonably secure and is a convenient way to get firmware-
specific keys following the Falcon specification.
Those checks also execute in reverse order, so that
KeygenLdr can ensure that Boot has not been tampered with,
for example. On top of this CMAC, TSEC verifies page by
page that any signed payload the payload is indeed signed, at
the hardware level, before granting it the HS privileges. Those
pages are then marked secret and cannot be read anymore
until CPU halt, where trying to read from it would return
0xDEAD5EC1.
Now that we’ve covered that, let’s assume we are working
with earlier TSEC firmwares, for brevity. Those are easier
to work with, while maintaining, thanks to the nature of our
exploit, the exact same level of control.
Keygenldr, during normal operation, reads that blob of data,
so that it can parse it and check the first stage size and CMAC
hash, in our case Boot. This is done in order to retroactively
verify that it hadn’t been tampered with. The thing is, this
blob of data is not authenticated. We can control both the size
and content of data being copied over, hence, we can control
a rudimentary stack smash. To go about that, we can have
KeygenLdr copy our modified boot payload, fail verification,
and return. Fortunately for us the verified MAC has not been
cleared from memory, so we can restart the process along with
this MAC, pass verification and return to our crafted ROP
gadgets, allowing us to get ROP code execution in the Heavy
Secure mode of the TSEC.
The exploit described above is used to get ROP code
execution after Keygen has been decrypted, but its pages
have been marked secret. We could optionally get it after
the verification has failed, but we would be unable to decrypt
Keygen. We would also like to note that the same result could
have been replicated thanks to design flaws of the TSEC that
we shall not further discuss here.
In brief:
• The community behind developing homebrew software
is pervasive; methods to gain homebrew access are often
invasive, and often co-opted by software pirates.
• It is very difficult to secure a system where the boot chain
of trust has been compromised.
• Adding a new cryptographically-secure system may seem
like a good protection against such a compromise moving
forward, but keep in mind that added complexity makes
for a larger attack surface.
• Understand that using symmetric algorithms (such as
AES) where asymmetric crypto would typically be em-
ployed, means that a compromise of the key or keystream
will allow forging the data in question.
• If you’re depending on unauthenticated data from within
a high-security domain, even if it is only accessible by
highly-privileged code, exercise due diligence on ensur-
ing that the data is valid — e.g., employ bounds-checking
on structures in the data.
As a side note, we would like to warn the interested reader
that, should they decide to further attempt to understand the
secure boot process of the Switch by reading the publicly
available Atmosphe`re [34] reference code, take note that the
key-generation is not done for 7.0.0 firmwares in the same
way that it is done on the original bootloader.
Sept [35], is a payload they designed to bypass checks
implemented in SecureBoot. It does so by loading the original
7.0.0 TSEC firmware, unmodified. The TSEC firmware is
designed to verify the AES CMAC of the PK11 binary,
before returning execution to the bootloader there. Sept works
because the CMAC was forged on the custom PK11, passing
the code authentication routines in SecureBoot. Sept, now in
PK11, derives keys in place in package1Ldr and scrambles the
TSEC and TSEC root key, making it impossible whatsoever to
use the original Secure Monitor firmware, as it doesn’t have
the keys necessary to further perform key generation.
VI. CONCLUSION
We completely broke the security system of one of the most
secure embedded consumer devices on the market with no
prior knowledge of its hardware nor software.
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Unlike most of the existing literature on computer science
security, we decided to focus on the inductive process of
finding security flaws and fixing them, rather than explaining
how they work and implementing exploits for them. This
decision was motivated by having most of the security flaws
we independently found already published online, some being
released before or even during [36] the writing of this paper!
Our inability to talk about some potentially damaging non-
public security vulnerabilities related to the Tegra X1 did not
help either. We also think finding flaws in embedded devices
is much more interesting to write about, as a whole.
We would also like to stress that this paper’s ultimate goal
is not to expose Nintendo’s flaws, but rather to help computer
security research be aware of such possible flaws, and as such
would like to give our point of view on what could have been
improved by Nintendo to avoid those exploits.
Firstly, exploits such as sm:h and pl:utonium seem to present
a crucial lack of in depth auditing. While we are aware
that auditing the entire runtime code of the Switch firmware
would be impractical, serious security audits must be done on
every privileged bit of code that could be harmful and are a
prime attack target, which is indeed the case of the NS and
SM servers. Optionally, switching to safer languages (such
as Rust [37]) or formally-verified coding paradigms, would
have altogether avoided both of those flaws. If some code
has to be privileged and yet not trusted, such as a blob of
third party code, then it is good practice to try to isolate it as
much as possible. Positioning services such as pl:u separately
from the main NS services is also a good idea, even though
such separation should have been more pronounced in that
particular case.
Moving on to any secure code attacks and secure key
retrieval: it is crucial to add anti glitch measures to make
glitching with low-cost, low-complexity equipment as hard
as possible. Depending on your threat model, it might also
be a good idea to encrypt the ROM stored inside the SoC.
While a powerful attacker could, ultimately, decap the SoC,
reverse engineer cryptography primitives used to decrypt the
boot ROM [38], and laser glitch his way around the program,
the process should be as arduous as possible if we want any
cryptographically secure software boot on devices at all. Decap
and laser glitching will most likely always be possible, but
when this becomes part of the least effort approach then we
might have some chance at protecting secrets.
Any code implementing any cryptography primitive, espe-
cially if it’s considered secure and crucial to the chain of trust
in a system, should not only be audited in order to avoid
basic security issues, but also be hardened against side-channel
attacks, such as power analysis and fault injection [39], at the
very least, to avoid any early breakage of the trust chain.
Ultimately, security is defined by failures thereof. Software
Engineering should learn from traditional engineering in that
point, as software and software systems CAN fail, and we
should accordingly plan for even a slim margin of error in that
regard. As such, mitigations against common faults in software
security should be graciously applied whenever possible, and
a clear list of everything a user could potentially control, must
be set.
A sad thing about security, is that it is mostly decided
by your budget. Even if you have a state-level intelligence
threat the smaller your budget is, the less you’ll invest in
security, if this isn’t one of your unique selling points. This
shows in IoT devices and, in some cases, forced hackers to
exploit vulnerabilities, in order to patch them. Our approach
to security should change altogether.
We must focus on putting the best practices at the forefront,
to the point that they are the easiest to implement, otherwise
we will continue to be trapped in the conspiracy against trust.
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